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iAbstract
The growing popularity of Android devices has made them an increasing
target for malicious apps. Of course, a malicious app is most effective when
a user is not aware of its intent. Therefore, they often take the form of
ostensibly benign, helpful, and, for that matter, free applications. Our goal
is to discover how common this is among free camera applications. Camera
applications are a good test case because they ought to be very simple. This
paper uses static analysis on the Dalvik byte code of camera applications to
search for certain characteristics or identify applications that demonstrate
behavior that is not expected by the user.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Android devices have consistently been targets of applications that seek to
behave either maliciously or in a way that does not match its stated purpose.
This is due in part to the popularity of Android devices and the ease of
publishing an app. In this paper we seek to use byte code analysis to identify
those applications that employ features or demonstrate behavior that one
would not expect from the purpose of the application.
On the Google Play store alone there are millions of free apps, thousands
of which are camera apps.[1] A trend that is noticeable in the Play Store
1
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with camera apps, as well as other types, is an over-saturation of free apps.
There are countless applications that do the same thing as another app, with
no obvious distinction. Potential motivations for the large number of free
Android applications are wanting to create apps for resumes, code piracy,
and attempting to disguise malicious apps as useful ones.
In the past the Google Play Store has had a problem with the number of
malware apps that make their way into the marketplace. These apps appear
to be legitimate, sometimes even mirroring popular apps. The creators of
these apps want to attract the largest possible number of users so they create
free apps in hopes that more people will download them.
This paper will highlight the key aspects to understanding and evaluating
Dalvik byte code. It will also explain the process that is needed to get the
data from an APK (Android Package Kit) file so that we can understand
its nature. The paper will then look at the data it created and explain the
conclusions that can be drawn from the data.
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1.2 Related Works
The DroidAPIMiner project by Yousra Aafer, Wenliang Du, and Heng Yin
from the Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science at Syra-
cuse University uses static analysis on the byte code of Android applications
to classify those applications. The project sought to build a classifier for
Android apps that would overcome the shortcomings of permission-based
warning mechanisms. The paper focused on API level information in the
byte code, the package levels, and their parameters, in an attempt to classify
malware. From this paper we used the Android methods that they identified
as having a higher correlation towards malware apps than benign apps.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Background
Using the APK files for various camera applications we sought to collect their
byte code and compare the invocation of specific Android API level methods.
We wanted to look for apps that might be demonstrating suspicious behavior
and did so through static analysis of the byte code. Suspicious behavior might
include making method calls that are irrelevant or not needed for the purpose
of an application.
Malicious behavior in Android applications has been an ongoing issue.
An app might seem, on the surface, to be a genuine app, but underneath it
4
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might be performing some suspicious activities. An application might go “off
the rails” when it starts to demonstrate behavior that we would not expect
for a benign app or one of that type. This type of behavior might include
bitcoin mining, for example. Clearly the programmer would want to mask
their activity, as most users would not consent to this type of behavior on
their device. This is why many malware applications appear as legitimate,
free applications, because they hope to attract the largest possible number
of users in order to take over as many devices as possible.
2.2 Static Analysis
Static analysis is the analysis of computer code. Unlike dynamic analysis,
which executes a program and analyzes its behavior, static analysis functions
by considering the program before execution. The level of analysis that is
used can vary from looking at individual functions to looking at the complete
source code. Static analysis can be used to find various errors in a program
such as potential coding errors, program-breaking bugs, and potentially ma-
licious behavior.
One of the most common forms of static analysis is type checking. Type
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checking is performed by the compiler whenever a program is compiled.[2]
Type checking is important because it guarantees a few things before execut-
ing a program. First it makes sure that the arithmetic operations are valid
and computable. For example, in a language like Java, it makes sure that you
can not add an integer to a Boolean. It also makes sure that functions are
called with the proper number and type of arguments. One of the last things
that type checking guarantees is undeclared variable analysis. For example,
in Java, this makes sure that an undeclared variable will never be read by
the program.
Another form of static analysis that is executed in the compiler is op-
timization. Optimization is useful in converting code into a format that is
better in terms of run-time and memory for the machine. It performs op-
erations like simplifying arithmetic equations into fewer steps and carrying
out partial evaluation in a loop during compilation so that it doesn’t have to
recompute.
Another implementation of static analysis is on a whole program level,
not just type checking. Several systems, where a failure during use could
have catastrophic effects, rely on static analysis instead of dynamic analy-
sis.[3] These systems include things like medical devices, nuclear power plant
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software, and aviation software.[4] In all of these systems, static analysis is
the preferred method, since dynamic analysis would open the systems up to
vulnerabilities or potential hazards at runtime.
2.3 Byte Code
Byte code is the machine language of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) and
Dalvik Virtual Machine(DVM), which are what allow a computer to execute
either Java or Dalvik code. Android applications specifically rely on Dalvik
byte code and the Dalvik Virtual Machine since the APK file contains the
.dex code, which is in Dalvik form.[5]
Dalvik byte code was created specifically for the Dalvik Virtual Machine.
This has since been replaced with the Android Runtime Environment (ART).
The Android Runtime Environment still uses the Dalvik byte code and .dex
files in order to maintain backwards compatibility. In order to understand
the Dalvik byte code it is important to understand the DVM and how it
works.
The DVM is a virtual machine that is optimized for use on mobile devices.
This works by compiling the Java code into byte code for the JVM, which is
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then translated into Dalvik byte code and saved in a .dex file.[6] The contrast
is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Java vs Dalvik Byte Code [7]
The Dalvik virtual machine is register-based and has frames of a fixed
size that are set upon creation. Since the virtual machine is register-based
and not stack-based, it needs fewer, but more complex instructions.[8] Each
frame is made up of only a particular number of registers which is specified
by the method.[9] The Dalvik byte code works by feeding multiple opcodes to
the virtual machine which serve as a set of instructions. Whenever a virtual
machine executes a program it receives a stream of opcodes for each method
in the class, which tell the virtual machine how to execute the program.
Figure 2.2 is an example of the byte code for a method. The first line is
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the method being declared. The next line, 0, has an opcode iget-objectv0. In
this line the virtual machine reads an object reference instance field into x,
or Landroid/support/b/a/i, and then the instance is referenced by y, in this
case Landroid/graphics/drawable/Drawable. The next line, 4, looks to see if
v0 == 0 and if so it jumps to 9. Line c has an opcode invoke-virtual, which
is where it invokes a virtual method. The method it is invoking is outline
by the pattern, ‘class;->method’. In this case the class is Landroid/graphic-
s/drawable/Drawable and the method is getInstrinsicHeight. The next line
moves the result from the previous method to v0 and the following one re-
turns the value of v0. The next three lines are all similar to line 0. Line 22
converts a float into an integer, in this case it is converting v0. The last line
tells it to jump back up to line 8.
Figure 2.2: Dalvik Byte Code Example
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Since smart phones have less memory than modern laptop or desktop
computers the DVM is optimized for low memory requirements and has spe-
cific characteristics that differentiate it from other standard virtual machines.
For example, the constant pool has been modified to use only 32-bit indices
to simplify the interpreter. Standard Java bytecode executes 8-bit stack in-
structions and local variables must be copied to or from the operand stack by
separate instructions. Dalvik instead uses its own 16-bit instruction set that
works directly on local variables. The local variable is commonly picked by
a 4-bit “virtual register” field. This lowers the instruction count and raises
the interpreter speed.[10] These features make it more efficient for use on
portable devices, where memory is limited.
2.4 APK Files
APK files, which stands for Android Package Kit, are used by the Android op-
erating system to distribute and install applications onto the devices. APKs
are a type of archive file, like ZIP and JAR files. The APK contains all
of the program’s code including the .dex files, which we use to analyze the
byte code. The files are created by compiling a program for Android and
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packaging all of its components into one file. A user can download APK
files from official sources, like the Google Play Store, or from other unofficial
marketplaces. A user can also install an APK directly from their computer
via third party applications.
Figure 2.3: APK File Structure [11]
Figure 2.3 shows the file structure of an APK file. At the top level is the
APK. Inside the APK file are two sub-directories, META-INF and res. In
the META-INF folder is the application’s meta data on the contents of the
APK, as well as the signature for it. In the res folder are three sub-folders.
The first is drawables which is where the .png files are located, which are
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used to generate the images for the application. The next subfolder, layout,
consists of binary xml files. The third subfolder is xml, which has more
binary xml files for the application. There are then three files, resources.arsc,
AndroidManifest.xml, and classes.dex. The first file, resources.arsc, contains
the compressed resources file, which helps direct the application to its various
resources. The AndroidManifest.xml file presents essential information about
the application to the Android system. This is information the system must
have before it can run any of the application’s code. Finally the classes.dex
file, the one we are interested in, contains the Java code and all the classes
converted into Dalvik byte code.
2.5 Androguard
Androguard is an open source APK decompilation program written in Python
that allows one to reverse engineer an application.[12] The application allows
one to access the .dex file in the APK and the various components that it
comprises. A user is able to create a DalvikVMFormat object which then
allows them to access the Java class files that make up the .dex file. From
here one can retrieve various pieces of information, such as all the classes and
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methods, the source code, and the Dalvik byte code. For our purposes, we
only focused on the byte code and the methods invoked within it.
2.6 Mathematica
Wolfram Mathematica is a technical computing system developed by Wol-
fram Research. Its functionality covers a wide range of technical computing,
including neural networks, machine learning, image processing, geometry,
data science, and visualizations.[13] The program is useful for generating
various graphs and models, based off of different statistical methods.
We chose Mathematica because we needed statistical inference to examine
and compare the APK files. While it is easy to get the raw data, Mathematica
does a good job converting the raw data into something useful that we can
analyze. We specifically used Mathematica to generate clusters and graphs
for our data.
The main functions that we used in Mathematica were FindClusters and
ListPlot. The FindClusters function allowed us to generate clusters for our
scatter plot data using different clustering algorithms such as k-means, mean
shift, and Gaussian mixture.
Chapter 3
Methods
3.1 Overview
Given a camera application we want to examine its byte code in order to
determine whether the application is behaving in a way that one would ex-
pect. In order to do so we considered the methods that were invoked in the
byte code. For each application we extracted the byte code and counted
the number of times that it invoked a particular “suspicious” method. The
following sections are sequentially ordered and contain brief explanations of
the process at each step. Figure 3.1 is a visual representation of the process
we used.
14
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Figure 3.1: Process Flow Chart
3.2 Collecting APKs
The first step was gathering applications to make up the dataset. All of
the applications that we used came from the Google Play Store. Since we
wanted to focus on camera apps we gathered a sample of 100 unique, free
camera apps. We chose free apps in order to control cost and because many
malicious apps are made free in order to attract the largest number of users.
To download an application’s APK file we used the desktop version of the
Google Play Store and the website APK Downloader.[14][15] The website
allowed us to download an APK file without using a physical Android device.
We downloaded each application by hand.
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3.3 Selecting Methods
In order to determine whether an app was behaving in a way that we expected
we needed a set of specific method calls to look for. We wanted to look for
method calls that would be consistent across all Android applications, so we
looked at Android API level methods. We also wanted method calls that
would be indicative of behavior that we would not expect for an Android
camera application. Again we could use the Android API methods for this.
The methods that we searched for came from the DroidAPIMiner paper,
which found the method calls that were most frequent in a set of malware
apps compared to a set of benign apps. From the paper we selected the
twenty method calls that were most frequent in the set of malware applica-
tions. Figure 3.2 displays the twenty methods we used and the difference in
frequency that were found in malware apps compared to benign apps.
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Figure 3.2: Top 20 Methods with the Highest Difference Between Malware
and Benign Apps [16]
3.4 Byte Code Extraction
The next step in analyzing an application after downloading the APK file
is to extract the byte code. We extracted the byte code from the APK file
by writing a script based off of the Androguard platform and the tutorial
written by Keith Makan. [12][17]
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def dump methods ( f i l e , o u t f i l e ) :
a = apk .APK( f i l e )
d = dvm. DalvikVMFormat ( a . get dex ( ) )
bc f = open( o u t f i l e , ”w+” )
for c u r r e n t c l a s s in d . g e t c l a s s e s ( ) :
for method in c u r r e n t c l a s s . get methods ( ) :
bc f . wr i t e ( ” [ ∗ ] ”+method . get name ( )+ method . g e t d e s c r i p t o r ( )+”\n” )
byte code = method . ge t code ( )
i f byte code != None :
byte code = byte code . ge t bc ( )
idx = 0
for i in byte code . g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s ( ) :
bc f . wr i t e ( ”\t , %x ” % ( idx )+i . get name ( )+i . get output ( )+”\n” )
idx += i . g e t l eng th ( )
The script takes in an APK file for an application and writes the byte
code to a specified file. The script uses the Androguard program to create
both an apk and dvm object. With the dvm object we were able to loop over
all of the classes of the application and the methods for each class. Each
time we looped over a method we generated the byte code for it and wrote
the byte code out to a file.
3.5 Byte Code Refinement
Once we generated the byte code for an application, we needed to refine it
in order to efficiently and correctly search for specific methods. Removing
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unnecessary lines of byte code so that it is just a list of the methods that were
invoked allows for more efficient searching. Our program loops over a file and,
the regular expression (invoke.+, )(.+)( \(), finds all of the instances in the
byte code where a method was invoked. It then writes the specific methods’
name to a file, removing both the Dalvik opcodes and the parameters used in
the method. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the difference in the byte code before
and after it is refined.
Figure 3.3: Byte Code Before and After Refinement
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3.6 Method Counting
With the list of methods invoked we sought to count the number of times
that each distinct method appeared in the application. Looping across a file
that contained all the methods we were able to create a dictionary for all
the methods. Each time the script came across a method that was not in
the dictionary it added the method to the dictionary. When it came across a
method that was in the dictionary it increased the count for that method by
one. When the method finished running it would write out the information
to a csv file for analysis.
3.7 Generating Data
After counting the number of times each method appeared we looked for the
number of “suspicious” methods in each application. To count the number
of “suspicious” methods in each application we wrote a Python script that
looped over all the counted methods. When it came across a method that
was in the set of “suspicious” methods it retrieved the count for that spe-
cific method and added it to the total count of suspicious methods for that
application. We ran this script on our 100 apps to generate the dataset.
Chapter 4
Data
For our data we determined which methods each application invoked via the
byte code. This required us to extract the byte code from each application
and analyze it. We counted the number of times that each unique method
was invoked in an app. We used this to make it easier to count the number
of times “suspicious” methods were invoked. After we had the total count
of method invocations we looked at the number of times an app invoked a
“suspicious” method. The methods we considered for were the ones generated
from the DroidAPIMiner paper, as described in the Section 3.2. From those
two values we calculated the proportion of method calls in each app that we
classified as “suspicious” methods.
21
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Figure 4.1 is a visual representation of the data. Each dot represents an
application. The x-axis is the total number of method invocations for each
app and the y-axis is the number of “suspicious” invocations.
50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
50
100
150
Figure 4.1: Total Number of Methods vs “Suspicious” Methods
We used a scatter plot to represent the data in order to show the relation-
ship between the total number of methods and the number of “suspicious”
methods. Plotting this relationship allowed us to understand a few things.
The first is that we get a sense of the number of “suspicious” methods that an
app invokes compared to the other applications by looking at its y-value. If
an app invokes a lot of “suspicious” methods then we might want to examine
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it further.
We also get a sense of what percentage of the method calls are “sus-
picious” by comparing it to the total number. Knowing the proportion of
method calls that are “suspicious” is helpful because it allows us to see if a
particular app makes “suspicious” calls more frequently than we would ex-
pect. This can be helpful if there is a small app that might only have few
method invocations, but a large proportion of which are considered “suspi-
cious” or a large one that, by its nature invokes a lot of methods, but invokes
“suspicious” ones at a rate that we would expect.
Some noteworthy apps from the results are apps 3 and 63, which did
not have any “suspicious” method calls. App 66 had the most “suspicious”
method calls with 177, but app 62 had the highest proportion of “suspicious”
method calls at 0.001833367285. There was also a group of applications that
appeared to be identical to each other. Apps 13, 14, 36, 77, and 88 all had
the same number of total methods as well as the same number of “suspicious”
methods. Table B.1 in Appendix B shows full list of all the applications and
the results from the tests.
Chapter 5
Analysis
5.1 Intro
We used multiple clustering algorithms via Mathematica to analyze our data.
The various algorithms yielded results that were slightly different from each
other which provided distinct interpretations of the data. Clustering the
data is a useful step since the clusters as a whole can tell us more than each
individual data point can. By looking at clusters of data we get a sense of
different types or characteristics that might be in the applications.
24
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5.2 Mean Shift Clustering
In order to cluster the data we used the mean shift clustering algorithm. The
mean shift algorithm produced three clusters from our data. The first clus-
ter included the applications that had less than 110,000 method invocations,
the second containing those in between 110,000 and 150,000 method invoca-
tions, and the third containing the applications with over 150,000 method
invocations. The results of this method can be seen in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Mean Shift Clustering
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Mean shift clustering is an analysis technique for locating the maxima
of a density function. It is known as a mode-seeking algorithm. The mean
shift algorithm works by finding a random point and window W. It then
calculates the center or mean of W and shifts the search window to the mean.
It continues this process until convergence. To create multiple clusters one
creates points at all the data points and performs the mean shift algorithm
until convergence. One then merges the windows that end up around the
same mode.
5.3 Agglomerate Clustering
The agglomerate clustering method is similar to some of the others since it
uses the Euclidean distance to group data points. The algorithm starts by
considering each point as an individual cluster. At each step it merges the
closest pair of clusters, based on Euclidean Distance, into one larger cluster.
The process repeats until the desired number of clusters remain. The results
of this method are represented in Figure 5.2
Unlike the mean shift algorithm the agglomerate clustering method re-
sulted in five clusters. A few of these clusters contained only a handful of
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Figure 5.2: Agglomerate Clustering
applications, but the last cluster was by far the largest containing 51 of the
100 applications. The last cluster contained all the applications that invoked
more than 120,000 methods. The rest of the applications were divided into
four clusters.
5.4 Gaussian Clustering
We used a Gaussian mixture algorithm to see if there were any subpopu-
lations within the data. The model is useful for identifying subpopulations
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when one is unsure of their existence. This method of clustering differs from
the others in that the model is based on probability. Instead of looking to
see how close two points are, it looks to see whether a dataset displays a
normal, or Gaussian distribution. The resulting cluster is demonstrated in
Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Gaussian Mixture Clustering
While the other methods gave us multiple clusters, the Gaussian cluster-
ing method only resulted in one cluster. Based off of this model it would
appear that there are not any subpopulations in the data.
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5.5 K-Means Clustering
K-means clustering is similar to the mean shift and agglomerate clustering
methods. The algorithm gets its name since it partitions the data into k dif-
ferent clusters that are based on mean distances. K-means works by creating
k initial points and creating clusters around those points based on Euclidean
distance. It then moves the points to the center of their respective cluster
and recalculates the clusters. It continues this until there is no change in the
clusters. The resulting clusters for this method with k values of 3, 4, and 10
are shown in Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively.
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Figure 5.4: K-Means Clustering with k = 3
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Figure 5.5: K-Means Clustering with k = 4
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Figure 5.6: K-Means Clustering with k = 10
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Due to the number of distinct clusters the k-means method yielded, it
supplied us with some of the most useful data for our analysis. The different
clusters provided us with various interpretations of the data.
5.6 Analysis of Clusters
The Gaussian mixture algorithm only yielded one cluster. In terms of our
analysis of the applications this means one of two things; either all the apps
are benign or all of the apps are malicious. Considering that some of the apps
had 0 “suspicious” method calls it does not make sense for those applications
to be classified as malicious. Since the algorithm grouped all the apps to-
gether it is safe to assume that, according to the model, all the applications
are benign. If we were to compare another application to this data set either
it is in the cluster or not. This means that an app would be considered either
benign or “suspicious” with no grey area.
The other algorithms, k-means, mean shift, and agglomerate, yielded
more interesting results. Through each of these clustering methods we were
able to get multiple clusters for the data. Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.4 appear
to be the ones that best represent a cluster of applications that, in the best
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case, are “suspicious” and, at worst, potentially malicious.
Looking at Figure 5.6 we can see the results of k-means clustering when
k = 10. The larger clusters we saw in both Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5, where
we used k-means clustering with k values of 3 and 4, respectively, begin to
break up into smaller clusters. These clusters are only comprised of a handful
of applications. It is interesting to see how in Figure 5.5 a k value of 4 yielded
two clusters, but a k value of 10 yielded ten clusters.
Resulting from all three of these algorithms was a cluster that included
all the applications that invoked 150,000 or more methods. These applica-
tions consistently had the most “suspicious” method calls. Therefore, there
is evidence to suggest that these applications are doing something other than
what we expect them to do. There are also several applications in this clus-
ter that have some of the highest proportion of “suspicious” method calls.
We consider the applications in these clusters to be the “suspicious” applica-
tions, since they make a significant number of method calls that correlate to
malware and are not related to camera functions. We would want to further
examine these applications and potentially reject them.
Looking at all of the clusters we noticed that there are several of them
that start with apps that invoke 120,000 methods. These clusters can be seen
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in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.5, and 5.6. Upon further examination of these clusters
we discovered a group of applications that had the same total number of
method invocations as well as the same number of “suspicious” methods.
Upon further examination of these applications it was revealed that they
were created by only two different developers. Each developer had multiple
applications under their name, all of which were camera apps.
We ran our byte code analysis program on sixteen of the applications cre-
ated by the two developers. This revealed that all sixteen of the applications
were nearly identical. All of the applications had 123,917 total method invo-
cations, expect one which had 123,914, and each of them had 80 “suspicious”
method invocations. These results can be seen in table B.2 in Appendix B.
One possible explanation for this is code piracy, where one developer
steals another’s application and only makes a few cosmetic changes so that
they appear different. Another possible explanation is that one developer
might have several apps that appear different, but are identical. Both of these
scenarios could be attempts to make it appear that they have created several
applications. This might be an attempt to increase potential monetization
opportunities. Whatever the reason, these both contribute to the surplus of
free camera applications on the Play Store.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary
Through static analysis of the byte code of multiple Android camera appli-
cations and the use of several clustering algorithms we are able to develop
clusters of applications that might engage in “suspicious” or irrelevant be-
havior. The applications that comprise these clusters are ones that have a
high number of “suspicious” method calls indicating that they are potentially
doing something unknown to the user or are malware. We would want to
“throw out” the applications that make up these clusters and examine them
further. Before they would be reinstated we would make sure that they are
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no longer demonstrating behavior that we would consider suspicious.
Along with applications that display “suspicious” behavior, we want to
include applications that seem to be identical to another application. There
is no good reason for one application to be exactly the same as another. After
investigating into several applications that seemed identical, we discovered
over a dozen applications that appeared to be the same. Whenever we dis-
cover a cluster of applications that are identical we could flag them and look
further into whether there is a legitimate reason for it or if there is something
else going on.
This can be useful in the Google Play Store where detecting potentially
malicious applications before they are released to the public is an important
task. The Play Store could use this approach to filter applications before
they allow them to be public. By looking at an application and noticing that
it might be doing something that it does not claim to do, they can reject
it for revision. This could also be useful for individuals who are curious or
concerned about a certain application that they downloaded. When looking
at a large number of applications we are able to see that there are some that
demonstrate behavior that can be “suspicious”.
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6.2 Future Work
With thousands of camera apps on the Play Store, the data set could be
expanded several fold. We could run the clusters on all the applications in the
Play Store and open it up for others to submit apps to as well. This would
give us a sharper understanding of the “typical” number of “suspicious”
method calls. We could then reject all the apps that are in the suspicious
clusters and periodically check them again to find new applications that
emerge.
Another way we could expand the project is to include known Android
malware apps, especially those that attempted to mimic camera apps. This
would allow us to develop a baseline to which we could compare the “benign”
camera apps. We would be able to, with more certainty, correlate certain data
points or clusters with malware.
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Appendix A
Gathering Methods
A.1 dump methods.py
This code is based off of the tutorial written by [17] and modified to fit our
needs.
from sys import argv
from androguard . core . bytecodes import apk
from androguard . core . bytecodes import dvm
def dump methods ( f i l e , o u t f i l e ) :
a = apk .APK( f i l e )
d = dvm. DalvikVMFormat ( a . get dex ( ) )
bc f = open( o u t f i l e , ”w+” )
for c u r r e n t c l a s s in d . g e t c l a s s e s ( ) :
for method in c u r r e n t c l a s s . get methods ( ) :
bc f . wr i t e ( ” [ ∗ ] ”+method . get name ( )+ method . g e t d e s c r i p t o r ( )+”\n” )
byte code = method . ge t code ( )
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i f byte code != None :
byte code = byte code . ge t bc ( )
idx = 0
for i in byte code . g e t i n s t r u c t i o n s ( ) :
bc f . wr i t e ( ”\t , %x ” % ( idx )+i . get name ( )+i . get output ( )+”\n” )
idx += i . g e t l eng th ( )
A.2 methodFinder.py
from regex import ∗
import re
import csv
#Funct ion t h a t makes new f i l e w i t hou t l i n e s t h a t dont have p a t t e r n
def se lectMethods ( fi leName , pattern , o u t f i l e ) :
fh = open( f i leName , ” r ” )
o f = open( o u t f i l e , ”w+” )
#loop
for l in fh :
i f ( re . search ( pattern , l ) ) :
m = re . search ( pattern , l )
o f . wr i t e (m. group (2)+”\n” )
#c l o s e f i l e
fh . c l o s e ( )
o f . c l o s e ( )
#count s t h e number o f unique methods in each apk
def methodCounter ( f i l ename , o u t f i l e ) :
fh = open( f i l ename , ” r ” )
o f = open( o u t f i l e , ”w+” )
#a t t r i b u t e s
l c = 0 #number o f t o t a l methods
dictM = {} #dic tMionary w i th methods and number o f apperances
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#loop
for l in fh :
l c +=1
i f l in dictM :
dictM [ l ] += 1
else :
dictM [ l ] = 1
w=csv . wr i t e r ( o f )
for key in dictM :
w. writerow ( [ key , dictM [ key ] ] )
fh . c l o s e ( )
o f . c l o s e ( )
#count s t h e number o f s u s p e c t methods in each apk
def createData ( f i l ename , o u t f i l e , dangMFile ) :
#f i l e s used
fh = open( f i l ename , ” r ” )
o f = open( o u t f i l e , ”a+” )
df = open( dangMFile , ” r ” )
#coun t e r s
totalCount = 0
dangCount = 0
#l i s t o f a l l t h e method c a l l s
dl = [ ]
#wr i t e a l l t h e s u s p e c t methods to a l i s t
for l i n e in df :
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( ’\n ’ )
d l . append ( l i n e )
reader = csv . reader ( fh , d e l im i t e r=’ , ’ )
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#loop ac ro s s t h e f i l e and see i f an methods are in d l
for row in reader :
totalCount = totalCount + int ( row [ 1 ] )
r = row [ 0 ] . s t r i p ( ’\n ’ )
i f r in dl :
dangCount = dangCount + int ( row [ 1 ] )
prop = dangCount/ totalCount
w=csv . wr i t e r ( o f )
w. writerow ( [ totalCount , dangCount , f ’{prop : . 1 0 f } ’ ] )
fh . c l o s e ( )
o f . c l o s e ( )
df . c l o s e ( )
A.3 main.py
import os
from methodFinder import ∗
from dump methods2 import ∗
#d i r e c t o r y w i th a l l t h e apks
d i r e c t o ry1 = ( ”/media/ blake /My Passport / Sproj /apks/” )
d i r e c t o r y = os . f s encode ( d i r e c t o ry1 )
for f i l e in os . l i s t d i r ( d i r e c t o r y ) :
f i l ename = os . f sdecode ( f i l e )
print ( f i l ename )
#check to see i f i t i s an APK f i l e
i f f i l ename . endswith ( ” . apk” ) :
#f i l ename i s a c t u a l name o f apk , f i x c on f u s t i o n
apk = d i r e c t o ry1+f i l ename
APPENDIX A. GATHERING METHODS 45
byteCodeFi le = apk+” bytecode . txt ”
methodsFile = apk+” methods . txt ”
methodCountFile = apk+” methodCount . csv ”
#check to see i f t h e f i l e s a l r e a d y e x i s t s
i f not os . path . e x i s t s ( byteCodeFi le ) :
#c a l l dump methods on an apk to g e t t h e b y t e code
dump methods ( apk , byteCodeFi le )
i f not os . path . e x i s t s ( methodsFile ) :
#Se l e c t on l y t h e l i n e s t h a t invoke a method
#Edi t t h e b y t e code so t h a t i t i s j u s t t h e method names
se lectMethods ( byteCodeFile , ” ( invoke .+ , ) ( .+) (\ ( ) ” , methodsFile )
i f not os . path . e x i s t s ( methodCountFile ) :
#count a l l t h e methods in t h e f i l e name
methodCounter ( methodsFile , methodCountFile )
#ge t t h e count s o f a l l t h e methods in q u e s t i o n
e l i f f i l ename . endswith ( ” methodCount . csv ” ) :
createData ( d i r e c t o ry1+f i lename , d i r e c t o ry1+”dangMethods . csv ” , d i r e c t o ry1+”
dangMethods . txt ” )
Appendix B
Results
B.1 Data Table
Reference Total Count “Suspicious” Count Proportion
1 54588 29 0.0005312522899
2 73923 35 0.0004734656332
3 9622 0 0
4 119718 21 0.0001754122187
5 76824 44 0.0005727376861
6 120511 81 0.0006721378131
7 31731 2 6.30E-05
8 13058 3 0.0002297442181
9 154591 87 0.0005627753233
10 177610 80 0.0004504250887
11 124971 65 0.000520120668
12 102216 65 0.0006359082727
13 123917 80 0.0006455934214
14 123917 80 0.0006455934214
15 176309 54 0.0003062804508
16 178677 100 0.0005596691236
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17 177026 129 0.0007287065177
18 128296 46 0.0003585458627
19 80223 31 0.0003864228463
20 183991 158 0.0008587376556
21 202851 167 0.0008232643665
22 247085 75 0.0003035392679
23 182960 126 0.0006886751202
24 181490 119 0.0006556835087
25 40748 25 0.0006135270443
26 140716 45 0.0003197930584
27 153089 37 0.0002416894747
28 65085 24 0.0003687485596
29 178535 92 0.0005153051222
30 172842 60 0.0003471378484
31 41611 20 0.0004806421379
32 186509 52 0.0002788069208
33 168228 122 0.0007252062677
34 73469 38 0.000517224952
35 95303 33 0.0003462640211
36 123917 80 0.0006455934214
37 170228 53 0.0003113471344
38 198379 151 0.000761169277
39 49800 6 0.0001204819277
40 54588 29 0.0005312522899
41 131032 50 0.0003815861774
42 117950 50 0.0004239084358
43 98192 45 0.0004582858074
44 55835 25 0.0004477478284
45 89113 11 0.00012343878
46 175521 43 0.0002449849306
47 137050 83 0.0006056183874
48 87663 40 0.0004562928488
49 134808 33 0.0002447925939
50 12957 8 0.0006174268735
51 187123 143 0.0007642032246
52 34621 4 0.0001155368129
53 189018 135 0.0007142176936
54 123914 80 0.0006456090514
55 227633 145 0.0006369902431
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56 163657 91 0.0005560409882
57 71433 16 0.0002239861129
58 53747 34 0.0006325934471
59 44381 22 0.0004957076226
60 66178 42 0.0006346519992
61 150615 95 0.0006307472695
62 4909 9 0.001833367285
63 1953 0 0
64 58456 16 0.000273710141
65 168420 110 0.0006531290821
66 160539 177 0.001102535832
67 129601 65 0.00050153934
68 69165 26 0.0003759126726
69 62382 40 0.0006412106056
70 65703 30 0.0004566001552
71 42434 6 0.0001413960503
72 33801 8 0.0002366793882
73 28981 4 0.0001380214623
74 61062 36 0.0005895647047
75 175120 77 0.0004396984925
76 71484 26 0.000363717755
77 123917 80 0.0006455934214
78 95918 20 0.0002085114369
79 181097 54 0.0002981827418
80 196206 69 0.0003516712027
81 131979 85 0.0006440418551
82 132538 39 0.0002942552325
83 210351 88 0.0004183483796
84 170789 110 0.0006440695829
85 41186 20 0.0004856019036
86 61819 12 0.0001941150779
87 24262 18 0.000741900915
88 123917 80 0.0006455934214
89 56003 28 0.0004999732157
90 93200 32 0.0003433476395
91 145751 62 0.0004253830162
92 67083 28 0.0004173933784
93 97593 45 0.0004610986444
94 28138 16 0.0005686260573
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95 28745 16 0.0005566185424
96 74869 22 0.0002938465854
97 164789 70 0.000424785635
98 168782 91 0.0005391570191
99 158936 89 0.0005599738259
100 47715 40 0.0008383108037
B.2 Similar Applications
Reference Total Count “Suspicious” Count Proportion
13 123917 80 0.0006455934214
14 123917 80 0.0006455934214
36 123914 80 0.0006456091
77 123917 80 0.0006455934214
88 123917 80 0.0006455934214
101 123917 80 0.0006455934
102 123917 80 0.0006455934
103 123917 80 0.0006455934
104 123917 80 0.0006455934
105 123917 80 0.0006455934
106 123917 80 0.0006455934
107 123917 80 0.0006455934
108 123917 80 0.0006455934
109 123917 80 0.0006455934
110 123917 80 0.0006455934
111 123917 80 0.0006455934
